Van Rensselaer Potter was the first voice to utter the word “bioethics,” yet he is too little appreciated by the bioethics community. My expectations for my first visit with Professor Van Rensselaer Potter were primed by conversations with leaders and historians of the field of biomedical ethics, including Warren Reich, Al Jonsen, and David Thomasma. When mentioning my interest in environmental ethics and my concerns for the current state of biomedical ethics, I was told that I must meet Van. On (...) my first visit to Madison, Wisconsin, Van met me at the McArdle Laboratories for Cancer Research at the University of Wisconsin, where he spent essentially his entire academic career as a basic oncological researcher. He was dressed informally and driving a rusting1984 Subaru station wagon with a license plate that read YES ZPG. We spent this first portion of our visit at the Institute where he is an Emeritus Professor and has contributed to understanding cancer metabolism as recognized by his election to the National Academy of Sciences. However, Van felt most at home in his shack located outside Madison. This country retreat included a rather primitive hut surrounded by acres of property owned by the family. I felt at the heart of Van's world when I sat in one of a pair of inexpensive plastic outdoor chairs in a particularly secluded part of the woods on the property, the place where Van himself communed with nature. (shrink)

In this article I try to refute the so-called "libertarian" theory of free will, and to examine how our conclusion ought to modify our common attitudes of praise and blame. In attacking the libertarian view, I shall try to show that it cannot be consistently stated. That is, my dscussion will be an "analytic-philosophic" one. I shall neglect what I think is in practice an equally powerful method of attack on the libertarian: a challenge to state his theory in such (...) a way that it will fit in the modern biology and psychology, which are becoming increasingly physicalistic. (shrink)

Background: Caring for terminally ill patients is a meaningful task, however the patient’s suffering can be a considerable burden and cause of frustration.Objectives: The aim of this study is to describe the experiences of general practitioners in The Netherlands in dealing with a request for euthanasia from a terminally ill patient.Methods: The data, collected through in-depth interviews, were analysed according to the constant comparative method.Results: Having to face a request for euthanasia when attempting to relieve a patient’s suffering was described (...) as a very demanding experience that GPs generally would like to avoid. Nearly half of the GPs strive to avoid euthanasia or physician assisted suicide because it was against their own personal values or because it was emotional burdening to be confronted with this issue. They explained that by being directed on promoting a peaceful dying process, or the quality of end-of-life of a patient by caring and supporting the patient and the relatives it was mainly possible to shorten patient’s suffering without “intentionally hastening a patient’s death on his request”. The other GPs explained that as sometimes the suffering of a patient could not be lessened they were open to consider a patient’s request for euthanasia or physician assisted suicide. They underlined the importance of a careful decision-making process, based on finding a balance between the necessity to shorten the patient’s suffering through euthanasia and their personal values.Conclusion: Dealing with requests for euthanasia is very challenging for GPs, although they feel committed to alleviate a patient’s suffering and to promote a peaceful death. (shrink)

This paper addresses a worry about backwards time travel. The worry is that there is something mysteriously inexplicable about the combination of commonplace events that will inevitably conspire to prevent the time traveler from doing something impossible such as killing her younger self. The worry is first distinguished from other problems for backwards time travel concerning its alleged impossibility or improbability. It is then shown that the worry is misplaced: there is in fact no real problem here. Yet the worry (...) has been widely expressed—so a suggestion is also made as to why it is so easy to get into the position of thinking that there is a genuine problem here, when in fact there is not. Finally, in light of the resolution of the inexplicability worry, a new way of dealing with the other two problems for backwards time travel—concerning its alleged impossibility and improbability—is proposed. (shrink)

One of Tarski’s stated aims was to give an explication of the classical conception of truth—truth as ‘saying it how it is’. Many subsequent commentators have felt that he achieved this aim. Tarski’s core idea of defining truth via satisfaction has now found its way into standard logic textbooks. This paper looks at such textbook definitions of truth in a model for standard first-order languages and argues that they fail from the point of view of explication of the classical notion (...) of truth. The paper furthermore argues that a subtly different definition—also to be found in classic textbooks but much less prevalent than the kind of definition that proceeds via satisfaction—succeeds from this point of view. (shrink)

‘Mental processes are brain processes’ is not a logically necessary truth, but nevertheless certain logical conditions must be fulfilled if it is to be a candidate for the role of contingent truth. Not just anything can, conceivably, be contingently identical with anything else: a play cannot be identical with its copies, nor beauty with a beautiful object. The propagation of light may be electromagnetic radiation, but it cannot conceivably be the tri-section of a right-angle. In this paper I shall be (...) concerned with the general question of whether there are any logical barriers to mind-body identification, and I shall approach this via the more particular question of whether the mental processes of persons can conceivably be identical with the physiological processes of brains. It is my contention that identity theorists, by concentrating their attentions upon what were once called the “lower” parts of the soul rather than upon “higher” parts which are more typical of human persons, have paved a logical way for themselves which is artificially straight. (shrink)

In this paper I shall deal with a new form of Optimism. Rationalists once believed that it was mistaken to suppose that a world without God is a meaningless one; material progress along with the improvement of men and their institutions, indefinitely protracted, ensured that life was meaningful. More recently it has become fashionable to claim that the pessimist, the cosmic mourner, is not mistaken at all, but rather incoherent. It is not that there is no answer to his question (...) but rather that no sensible question has been asked—at least in the terms in which he poses it. The latter qualification is necessary, for no one is denying that people's lives may either possess or lack meaning. Rather what is being denied is that life as a whole, tout court and without limitation, can be said either to have or not to have sense. One cannot, it is argued, regret what could not, logically, be otherwise, and since nothing could possibly count as endowing the cosmos as a whole with meaning it is not logically possible for the cosmos as a whole to have, or not to have, meaning. The regret evinced by the pessimist becomes, therefore, a pseudo-regret. ‘… it is perverse writes Ayer, ‘to see tragedy in what could not conceivably be otherwise.’ Just as a pseudo-problem is one for which there could, logically, be no solution, so a pseudo-regret is one in which there can be no assuagement of the regretted situation. None of this is to deny, of course, that a man can experience a state of mind which might be described as ‘cosmic anguish’, but such an experience has no cognitive value: it is a state of mind, no doubt painful for the possessor, which tells us nothing about the world beyond it. That people have confused this state of mind with a judgement about the world is understandable, but mistaken. (shrink)

Peut-être que jusqu'ici dans les recherches philosophiques sur la nature du temps on a attribué trop peu d'attention à la distinction entre « temps » comme catégorie mathématique d'une part, et « temps » comme il est réalisé dans des processus et des périodes d'autre part. Quand on essaie de combler ce vide, on éprouve le besoin d'impliquer dans ses considérations l'apparition fréquente de « nouveauté » et de « commencement ». C'est pourquoi on examine dans la première partie de (...) cet article comment nous nous formons une notion mathématique du temps. Il apparaît que cela se fait en idéalisant la perception des périodes. On s'imagine que l'unité du temps une fois choisie peut être reproduite exactement, et même jusqu'à l'inñni. En outre on s'imagine que chaque période peut être divisée en des intervalles arbitrairement petits. Un instant est pensé comme une limite nette entre le temps qui précède et le temps qui suit ; ici la séparation entre les deux parties du temps est posée comme absolue contre arrière-plan d'un temps dont justement la cohérence est posée comme absolue. C'est ainsi que naît la catégorie du temps comme une possibilité homogène, toujours égale à elle-même pour indiquer des instants indivisibles et pour délimiter des périodes, à savoir une possibilité qui s'étend sans limites des deux côtés de l'instant actuel, aussi bien vers l'avenir que vers le passé. Quand on indique un instant, deux notions contradictoires sont posées en même temps, à savoir une séparation absolue et une cohérence absolue. Dans la physique ce schéma mathématique s'avère extrêmement utile. Pourtant il s'agit de se rendre toujours compte de l'applicabilité défectueuse de ce schéma, de sorte qu'on fasse attention aux complications qui exigent un complément et une correction de la théorie. Quand on applique le même schéma aussi aux processus vitaux et aux événements psychiques, alors l'incohérence entre le schéma mathématique et la succession réelle des périodes se trouve encore plus grande. Dans la deuxième partie on analyse le « commencement ». De la manière la plus originelle un commencement se présente devant nous, quand nous essayons d'avoir une vue d'ensemble de notre propre vie, comme elle se trouve dans notre mémoire. Dans le passé nous rencontrons alors une frontière que nous ne pouvons pas marquer cependant nettement sur une échelle mathématique. Ainsi en analysant chaque commencement on doit distinguer de nouveau soigneusement le commencement dans le domaine mathématique de celui dans l'ordre réel. Le caractère abrupt qui est propre à un commencement « mathématique » se trouve absent dans un commencement « réel ». Dans la troisième partie il est démontré que le temps et le commencement sont inséparablement liés l'un à l'autre. Le temps réel apparaît partout dans des périodes ayant un commencement et ainsi dans un ensemble compliqué de commencement et de permanence. Toutes les totalités dans la nature vivante et dans la nature inanimée, les individus ainsi que les espèces, ont été neuves une fois. Avant ce commencement multiple notre univers a été neuf. Cependant, alors il appert que cette mesure perd son utilité. Lorsque l'univers était encore en gestation, notre temps, lui aussi, avec sa mesure était en formation. C'est pourquoi une localisation exacte du commencement de l'univers sur l'échelle du temps n'est pas seulement impossible, mais même absurde. Cependant, si un commencement ne peut jamais être déñni de façon mathématique, il est pourtant défini de sa manière particulière dans le temps, c'est à dire par une définition qui essentiellement contient une certaine imprécision. Quant au commencement de l'univers les sciences physiques conduisent par des chemins différents à un même résultat, et font conclure à un âge de l'univers de quatre milliards et demi d'années environ. Finalement une question concernant la notion de création se présente. La tradition connaît en effet une notion de création dans un sens très stricte, distinguée des notions de « conservatio » et de « concursus ». On a l'habitude de lier le fait de la création à un seul ou à quelques instants. Mais nous croyons pouvoir démontrer que dans la dépendance que les créatures ont a l'égard du Créateur, il y a toujours aussi un aspect d' « être créé » dans le sens cité plus haut, un aspect qui se met d'autant plus au premier rang qu'il y a plus de nouveauté et de discontinuité vis à vis du passé. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article:F.H. Bradley, Collected Works Volumes 1–5.

La situación laboral de los países desarrollados impone a la filosofía la tarea de pensar el trabajo en cuanto que los cambios producidos pueden afectar - y de hecho afectan- a la concepción de la persona, de la sociedad y del mundo actual. En este artículo, después de cuestionar que estemos asistiendo al final del trabajo a causa de la revolución tecnológica, analizaremos dos propuestas de reducción y reorganización del tiempo de trabajo, y otras dos que hacen referencia a un (...) cambio de paradigma: una rompe la actual barrera entre trabajo asalariado y trabajo no monetarizado, y la otra defiende el subsidio universal garantizado. (shrink)

Nesta obra, o propósito fundamental foi o de fornecer liberdade de investigação dentro do amplo leque tópico que, desde o início, marca a abertura problemática e problematizante do protocolo entre a UNISINOS e a FDUC. Desde as dimensões filosóficas às dimensões históricas, passando pelas dimensões teoréticas e dogmáticas do direito e do estado, aqui vem a convergir os interesses científicos do relevante número de investigadores e professores activamente comprometidos neste projecto.

The aim is to show that, for Dewey, "imagination" is not a rare activity of the human spirit. Rather, it is common to all human beings as a vehicle of learning, by which possibilities are determined, and attempts are made to actualize them in experience. Imagination does not make up things "unreal", but is the power of realizing what is not present. Children's images tend to express themselves in action, and all human beings may bring to life an imageof self (...) which looks forward to a wholeness of life that exceeds the reality of present selves. (shrink)

This response proceeds in three sections, each focusing on the role of cases in understanding the principle of double effect. The first section asks about the relationship between the principle and its cases: Does the principle authorize the cases or do the cases authorize the principle? To illustrate the latter claim's plausibility, certain aspects of the articles by Aulisio, Berkman, and Odozor are highlighted. Section two uses the cases of bombing in warfare and self-defense to explain reservations Mennonites are likely (...) to harbor about the principle. The third section focuses on a medical case to show why a concern for virtue must attend to the principle's distinction between what is intended and what is merely foreseen. (shrink)

The prophets of the Old Testament did make predictions, and biblical scholars are paying more attention to that fact. Now, serious theological reflection on what came of the predictions of the prophets is needed.

The emotion theory of concepts maintains that concepts may be in part constituted by sentiments and emotions. Very few works in the contemporary concepts literature discuss this possibility that concepts may be sentiments and emotions, and those that do discuss this possibility ultimately fail to establish the viability of this view. However, by in part relying on experimental evidence from psychology and neuroscience, I contend that some concrete and abstract concepts are in part constituted by sentiments and emotions.

The encyclopedic place of Biblical StudiesIs Biblical Studies part of theology, or has theology lost its grip on Biblical Studies, as it has lost its grip on Geology and Palaeontology as early as one and a half century ago?Is it possible to distinguish between different levels of Biblical study, some levels dealing with essentially theological questions and others with more general questions of a historical, archaeological, literary or linguistic nature?What is and should be the relationship between the Departments of Biblical (...) Studies on the one hand, and the Departments of Old Testament and New Testament on the other hand? (shrink)